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ESTABLISHING FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT BY A COUNTERCLAIMt
Jolm M. Fmmm*aG

Federal removal procedure is keyed to the original jurisdiction of the
district courts.1 Thus Section 1441 of the Judicial Code provides that
any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction may be removed by the "defendant or defendants,"'
provided further that none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in
which the action has been brought." In "diversity" cases, district courts
have original jurisdiction if the suit is between citizens of different states
and the "matter in controversy" is more than the sum or value of $3000
exclusive of interest and costs.' It is clear, therefore, that removal is
available to a foreign defendant if the plaintiff asserts against him in
a state court a claim in excess of $3000.5
A question that often arises in diversity cases, however, is whether
a counterclaim may be used to create the requisite amount in controversy

tThe author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contributions to the preparation and writing of this article made by William H. Dempsey, Jr., member
of the Washington, D.C. Bar and Clerk to Judge Charles Fahy of the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and Murry D. Brochin, member
of the New Jersey Bar and Clerk to Judge Nathan L. Jacobs of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. The author assumes full responsibility for the article,
however.
*Associate, Patterson, Belknap & Webb, New York. LL.B., Yale, 1955.
1. On removal in general see Mooas, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JuDICIAL
CODE 251-88 (1949), hereinafter cited MooRr, COMMENTARY.
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a) (1948). It is now settled that it is for the district court alone to decide whether removal is justified. MooR, COMMETARY 272.
And a district court's decision to deny removal and to remand is not reviewable.
Id. at 281. The removal petition must be filed in the district court for the district and division within which the state action is pending. Id. at 272.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (1948). See also MooRE, COMMENTARY 233.
4. The congressional grant of original jurisdiction in cases involving diver-

sity of citizenship is contained in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1948).
To establish "general federal question" jurisdiction it is also necessary that
the amount in controversy be in excess of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1948). However, the discussion that follows deals exclusively
with jurisdictional amount in diversity cases.
5. See MooRE, COMENTARY 231-37.

(243)
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and thus provide the jurisdictional basis for removal. Where the party
seeking removal in this situation is the state court plaintiff, his petition has
usually been denied either on the theory of waiver, or, if that element is not
present, on the theory that the right to remove is expressly limited by
Section 1441(a) to "defendants." Thus if a foreign plaintiff claims the
jurisdictional amount in a state court and is met by a counterclaim in
excess of $3000, it appears that the plaintiff by instituting his action in
the state court has waived all right to remove even if it is conceded that as
to the counterclaim he becomes a "defendant" within the meaning of Section 1441(a).' Even where a suit is for $3000 or less, and a counterclaim
is asserted for more than $3,000, there is considerable doubt that the
foreign plaintiff can remove, although the doctrine of waiver is obviously
inapplicable. Those courts which deny removal proceed on the theory
that the original status of the parties is controlling; a "plaintiff" cannot
be converted into a "defendant" by a counterclaim.' On the other hand,
a number of courts have adopted a more functional approach and have
permitted removal.8 They reason that a shift in the plaintiff's capacity
results from the assertion of a counterclaim against him and that he becomes a defendant as to the counterclaim.
It is settled law, however, that if a suit is commenced for less than
$3000, a foreign defen int cannot base a petition for removal on a counter-

6. West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. '(6 Wall.) 139, 142 (1867) (alternative
holding); San Antonio Suburban Irrigated Farms v. Shandy, 29 F.2d 579, 580-81
(D. Kan. 1928) (dictum) ; Zumbrunn v. Schwartz, 17 F.2d 609, 610 (D. Ind. 1927)
(dictum); cf. Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). But
see Bankers Securities Co. v. Insurance Equities Co., 85 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1936).
7. Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107, 108 (1941) (dictum)
(plaintiff's claim in excess of $3,000; counterclaim for $7,200 on a contract which
was separate and distinct from the indebtedness sued on by plaintiff); Waco
Hardware Co. v. Michigan Stove Co., 91 Fed. 289 (5th Cir. 1899) (suit for less
than jurisdictional amount; unrelated counterclaim in excess of jurisdictional
amount); of. West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1867) amount of
plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim not stated); Lee Foods v. Bucy,
105 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (claim less than jurisdictional amount;
counterclaim in excess of $3000; removal denied under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c)),
noted approvingly 52 CoL. L. Rnv. 282 (1953).
8. Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578 (E.D. Mo. 1889)
(suit for less than jurisdictional amount; counterclaim in excess of jurisdictional
amount related to original suit); Chambers v. Skelly Oil Co., 87 F.2d 853 (10th

Cir. 1937) (claim for less than $3000; counterclaim of more than $3000 arising
out of same transaction) ; Groveville Sales Co. v. Stevens, 16 F. Supp. 563, 564

(D.C. N.J. 1936) (claim less than $3000; counterclaim in excess of $3000), noted

approvingly 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 412 (1936); cf. Bankers Securities Co. v. In-

surance Equities Co., 85 F.2d 856, 857 (3rd Cir. 1936) (suit in excess of $3,000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/2
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claim in excess of $3000 which he is permitted but not compelled by state
practice to assert.' This rule stems from the fact that under state codes
the so-called permissive counterclaim need not be related to the transaction
which gives rise to plaintiff's claim for relief."° Thus the courts apparently
feel that the danger of oppression is great where unrelated claims may be
brought up or exhumed and asserted for removal purposes. Furthermore,
an unrelated claim appears to have little connection with the claim for
relief alleged by the plaintiff. And since the "plaintiff's viewpoint" theory
of detecting the presence or absence of the necessary elements of federal
jurisdiction is a cherished rubric of federal practice," these courts have
refused to look to permissive counterclaims to establish jurisdictional
amount.
But where a plaintiff's claim is for $3000 or less and a foreign defendant must plead a compulsory counterclaim which is in excess of $3000

9. Crane Co. v. Guancia, 132 Fed. 713 (S.D. N.Y. 1904); McKown v. Kansas
& T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (W.D. Ark. 1901); Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705
(S.D. Iowa 1891); LaMontagne v. Harvey, 44 Fed. 645, E.D. Wis. 1891); cf.
Stuart v. Creel, 90 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (type of counterclaim not
specified); Fearon Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Lawson, 166 Ky. 123, 178 S.W. 1121
(1915) (counterclaim less than jurisdictional sum).
Six states have enacted permissive counterclaim provisions which are substantially the same as FED. R. Civ. P., Rule 13 (b). Rule 13 (b) states: "A pleading
may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 645, n. 52 (2d ed. 1947). Compare the
companion FED. R. CMy. P., Rule 13 (a): "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action." (italics inserted) The latter enacts the so-called "compulsory" counterclaim, now adopted in
identical language by eleven states. CLARK,op. cit. supra at 645, n. 52, 646, n. 54.
Missouri has expressly provided for the compulsory but not the permissive
counterclaim. Mo. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.73-847.79. But see Atkinson, Missouri's

New Civil Procedure, 9 Mo. L. REV. 22 (1944), arguing that permissive counterclaims should be allowed under other broad provisions for joinder of claims generally by a defendant.

For a discussion of the counterclaim practice of other states see CLARK, op.

cit. supra at 642-53.
Unless otherwise noted, the terms "compulsory" and "permissive", as used
hereinafter in both text and footnotes, are defined in accordance with FED. R. Cirv.
P., Rules 13 (a) and 13 (b) respectively.
10. See note 9, supra.
11. See note 28, infra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1956], Art. 2

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

or lose it," a number of courts hold that the required jurisdictional amount
is present and that the defendant may remove."3 In these cases, the counterelaim must arise out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim,1'
and therefore the opportunity to abuse the rule in order to secure advantages under threat of removal is narrowed. Moreover, the fact that
the counterclaim must involve issues related to the plaintiff's claim furnishes some support for the argument that the claim and the counterclaim
are a single unit of litigation, or matter in controversy, from the "plaintiff's viewpoint." 1"

12. Under the federal rules and a number of state codes, failure to plead a
compulsory counterclaim in a suit which proceeds to judgment bars further litigation of that claim. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 648, nn. 58, 59, and 646.
Even where the res judicata effect of the judgment is not expressly provided for
by the state code, the courts will bar an independent suit on the counterclaim if
the issue was the same in both the plaintiff and defendant's claim. Id. at 646-47,
and cases cited therein.
13. Rosenblum v. Trulliger, 118 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Lange v.
Chicago R.I. & P. R.R., 99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951), noted 21 U. CIN.
L. REv. 88 (1951) (critically) 38 VA. L. Rav. 108 (1951) (approvingly);
Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1945); McKown v. Kansas & T.
Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (W.D. Ark 1901) (dictum); Wolcott v. Sprague, 55 Fed.
545 (D. Kan. 1891); Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (S.D. N.Y. 1880); of. Ginsburg v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1934).
14. See note 9, supra.
13.20 (2d ed. 1948). There are cases
15. See 3 MooPE, FEDERAL PRAcTicn
which go so far as to permit the creation of jurisdictional amount for removal
purposes by aggregation of a claim and a compulsory counterclaim neither of
which satisfies the jurisdictional sum required. See 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra 13.15
n. 11. And the rule is sometimes expressed in language so broad as to imply that
aggregation will be allowed even where the counterclaim is permissive. See
American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N.D. Ohio 1915) at
324. Professor Moore takes a dim view of the aggregation cases, 3 MOORE, op. cit.
13.20 n. 3, although his "single unit of litigation" theory, supra,
supra, at
might logically be extended to embrace those cases where the aggregated counterclaim was compulsory.
Other justifications given for removal where a compulsory counterclaim in
excess of $3,000 is asserted are less convincing. For example, it has been held that
allowing removal is "essential to the ends of justice." Wheatley v. Martin, supra
note 13. The meaning of this phrase is, apparently, that should the court rule
otherwise, a party could be "deprived" of his "right" to sue in a district court
by an opponent holding a small claim arising out of the same cause of action. See
Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., supra note 13. Thus, this theory runs, the opponent could hastily institute his suit in a state court first. The potential federal
plaintiff would then be forced to litigate his claim in the state court if the compulsory counterclaim were part of the state practice. Ibid. But the "aggrieved"
party is not thus prevented from instituting a separate original action on his claim
in the federal court, since it is assumed the claim satisfies the requirements of
jurisdictional amount. Therefore, the potential federal plaintiff is not "deprived"
of his federal forum. Furthermore, the value of the "right" to a federal forum
here is questionable since its value is predicated on the theory that the party
seeking to remove will be subject to local prejudice in the state court. See text
at notes 33-36, infra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/2
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0
Nevertheless, in the recent case of Barnes v. Parker,"
it was plainly
held for the first time that a defendant who pleaded a compulsory counterclaim for more than $3000 as required by the state practice was not entitled to remove the suit from the state court to the federal district court.
Plaintiff brought an action in the Missouri circuit court for breach of contract, praying damages in the sum of $2,161.30. While the cause was pending in the state court, defendant, "for the sole purpose of establishing
diversity of citizenship and establishing the requisite amount necessary to
render the cause removable,"'- filed an allegedly compulsory counterclaim
for $3,876.81 in the state court. At the same time, defendant submitted to
the state court a copy of his petition to the federal district court for removal."" After hearing the petition, the district court remanded the case. It
held that in determining the amount in controversy it was bound to look
solely to the amount prayed for in the complaint, regardless of subsequent
events in the action. Thus the court refused to follow the line of cases creating an exception to that rule where a compulsory counterclaim is asserted.1°
To recognize such an exception, the court reasoned, is to predicate federal
removal procedure on the vagaries of the classifications contained in state
practice codes, thereby sacrificing that orderly procedure and uniformity
of practice which has been the aim of all the federal removal acts."0 Second,
adherence to the exception would throw the door wide open to abuse of
removal practice and circumvent the "expressed intent" of Congress
to restrict removability; for a nonresident defendant would thus be able
to bring a claim asserted against him, no matter how minute, within the
jurisdiction of the federal court merely by fling a counterclaim to the
claim asserted against him."

The Barnes opinion overstates the dangers inherent in the line of cases
it rejects. Should the theory that the term "matter in controversy" in-

16. 126 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
17. Id. at 651.

18. In Haney v. Wilcheck, 38 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Va. 1941), the facts were
similar to the Barnes case and removal was denied. However, the Haney result
was pegged on the additional ground of waiver. The court stated that by filing
their counterclaim simultaneously with their petition to remove, defendants voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the state court by seeking its affirmative aid in
their behalf. Haney v. Wilcheck, supra at 355. In Barnes, removal was denied
solely because of the absence of jurisdictional amount.

19. See note 13, smpra.
20. 126 F. Supp. at 651.
21. Ibid.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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eludes a compulsory counterclaim be adopted, no reason appears why district courts could not use the definition of compulsory counterclaim contained in Rule 13(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the
relevant state practice code definition. The three cases cited by the Barnes
court are not strong authority for the proposition that the counterclaim
must be classified as compulsory under the local state practice before the exception will be invoked and removal allowed. It does not appear that it was
argued in any of the three cases that the federal instead of the state definition should control; and only in Wheatley v. Martin,2 did the court announce gratuitously that it was required to recognize the effect of the Arkansas practice code. Furthermore, in the other two cases cited, Rosenblum
v. Trufliger,0 and Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R.," the counterclaim
would have been compulsory under Rule 13 (a). Both cases involved counterclaims resulting from the same collision in which the state court plaintiffs were injured. The category of the counterclaim in the Wheatley case
is more doubtful.
The Barnes court's second argument rests on the assumption that a
defendant has free play to invoke the exception merely by filing any counterclaim. In fact, the cases have limited removal to the situation where the
counterclaim is compulsory."0 And the more recent cases disallow removal
where the counterclaim alone is not in excess of $3,000.20
But the result of the Barnes case is supported by the well-settled judicial principle of strictly construing the removal statute.2
Thus, the
amount in controversy is determined from the "plaintiff's viewpoint" as

22.
23.
24.
25.
(W.D.

62 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1945).
118 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
99 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
See cases cited note 13, supra; cf. Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109
Ark. 1945) (state practice code makes all counterclaims compulsory).
26. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926); of. Goldstone v.
Payne, 94 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1938). See also 3 Mooan, FEDERAL PRACTICE; f 13.15
(2d ed. 1948) at n. 15, criticizing courts which aggregate the claim and counterclaim.
27. "'Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments which
should actuate federal courts requires that they scrupulously confine their own

jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined."' Shamrock Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941) at 109, citing Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S.

263, 270 (1934); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932); Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-4 (1922); Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 578
(1882).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/2
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disclosed by his complaint well pleaded. " Moreover, the rule of strict construction and the corollary presumption in favor of state jurisdiction are
especially valid when applied to removal predicated on diversity of citizenship." Since Erie v. Tompkins," federal courts in diversity cases have been
required to decide questions of substance in accordance with applicable state
rulings, ascertainment of which is often difficult." And this diverse
citizenship litigation occupies more than its proportionate share of the
time of federal courts.'" Furthermore, the original policy basis of diversity
jurisdiction, fear of local prejudice against foreign parties, is largely a
fiction today." Nearly ninety per-cent of cases removed to the federal courts
on the ground of diversity are the result of defendant's incorporation in
a foreign state." Many of these "foreign" corporations do business in
their opp6nent's state," and if there is any danger of prejudice, it is
against large corporations as such, not "foreign" corporations. Hence it
is probable that removal by reason of diverse citizenship is used today primarily as a delaying device or bludgeon by which concessions are obtained in

28. See e.g. Stuart v. Creel, 90 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474, 476 (3d Cir. 1926). For an argument in support of
the "plaintiff's viewpoint" theory see Dobie, JurisdictionalAmount in the United
States District Court, 38 HAuv. L. R~v. 733, 744 (1925).

29. See generally on the validity of federal original jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship, Clark, Diversity of CitizenshipJurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L.Q. 499 (1928); A Note on
Diversity Jurisdiction--in-reply to Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097
(1931); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB. 216 (1948) ; Yntema & Jaflin, PreliminaryAnalysis of

Concurrent Jurisdiction,79 U. PA. L. Rsv. 869 (1931).
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. Moore, CommENTARY 335.
32. Clark, op. cit. supra note 29, at 503.
33. Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 29, at 521-22.
"According to Marshall's classic justification for diversity jurisdiction, the
Constitution entertained 'apprehensions' lest distant suitors be subjected to local
bias in state courts, or, at least, it viewed with 'indulgence' 'the possible fears and
apprehensions' of such suitors. Whatever may have been true in the early days of
the Union, when men felt the strong local patriotism of the politically nouveaue
riches, has not the time come now to reconsider how justifiable the apprehensions,
how valid the fears? The Civil War, the Spanish War, and the World War have
profoundly altered national feeling, and the mobility of modern life has greatly
weakened state attachments. Local prejudice has ever so much less to thrive on
than it did when diversity jurisdiction was written into the Constitution." Id. at
521.

34. Clark, op. cit. supra note 29, at 503.
35. Id. at 502.
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state courts, rather than as a method by which defendants protect themselves from local prejudice.'
But the limitation of the right of removal imposed by Barnes is easily
circumvented by the institution of duplicating litigation in a federal court.
And Barnes furnishes a strong incentive to a defendant to threaten such an
original action on his counterclaim, probably as potent a weapon for vexation as the threat of removal itself,'3 since it seems likely that the
defendant will be able to duplicate the entire state court action. For example, a foreign defendant may assert his state court counterclaim in an
original suit in the appropriate district court. The plaintiff is not required
to assert his claim by virtue of the proviso to Rule 13(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, that a compulsory counterclaim need not be pleaded "if
at the time that action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action."'" However, the state court plaintiff may assert his claim
as a counterclaim in the federal action if he so elects."' Moreover, it seems
probable that he will do so. Because of docket conditions or procedural
advantages, the federal forum may become the more favorable battleground.
And if the state court plaintiff can win in the federal court first, the judgment will usually be res judicata as to the state claim." A state court plaintiff would not foreclose this possibility by failing to assert his counterclaim.
Thus, it would appear that the identical issues being litigated in the state
suit will usually be presented to the federal court." Consequently, removal
of the original suit is in effect achieved by the state court defendant; only
the designation of the parties is different.

36. See Clark, op. cit. supra note 29, at 503; Frankfurter, op. cit. supra, note
33, at 524-25.
37. See Note, 38 YALE L.J. 997 (1928).
38. For the full text of the rule see note 9, supra.
39. 3 MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE fl

13.14 (2d ed. 1948).

40. See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922). The
issues tried in both cases will generally be the same. Furthermore, "identity
of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance." Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620 (1925). But see Campbell v. Ashler, 320 Mass. 475,
70 N.E.2d 302 (1946), criticized in 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 446 (1948).
41. A similar result is likely if the counterclaim is permissive within the
meaning of the federal rules or under a state practice code which classifies all
species of counterclaims as permissive. It may be asserted in the state court and
duplicated in an independent federal action so long as it is in excess of $3000.

Again the state court plaintiff will probably wish to plead his cause of action
as a counterclaim in the federal court. See text at note 40, supra.
Identical problems arise where suit is commenced initially in a federal court.
Thus complete duplication may occur where the federal defendant pleads a compulsory or permissive counterclaim and subsequently asserts it in an original
action in a state court. See text at notes 46-52, infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/2
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And it is clear that the two suits can properly proceed concurrently.
Where two in personam suits involving the same cause of action are litigated
in a federal and a state court of concurrent jurisdiction, neither court can
restrain the prosecution of the suit in the other forum.4" Nor is the defend3
ant entitled to an abatement of the subsequent suit in the federal court.'
Thus the state court plaintiff must suffer the expense and inconvenience
of two lawsuits. And the public interest in orderly, inexpensive judicial
procedure is also impaired. The duplication of proceedings necessitates
additional appropriations for the state and federal judiciary. Witnesses
must be shuttled from court to court. Moreover, since each suit will ordinarily be res judicata as to the other," both parties will attempt to rush to
judgment in the court in which success is deemed more probable. Conversely, delaying action in the disfavored forum is likely.
The problem is somewhat different where the state suit is subsequent.
Although the rule with respect to injunctive relief is the same in both
cases," a number of state codes provide that a pleader may demur to a
complaint "when it shall appear upon the face thereof .. .that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause
.. .

.,,

However, this defect will rarely appear on the face of the com-

plaint.' But "the codes generally provide, in connection with the statute
stating the grounds of objection which may be made by demurrer, that,
where any of these matters enumerated as grounds of demurrer do not

42. "Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without

reference to the pleadings in the other court." Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,

260 U.S. 226, at 230 (1922). On the other hand, "because of practical necessity
two in rem actions cannot proceed concurrently and hence the general rule is
that 'the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and
exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. . . .' MOORE, CommENTARY 404.

43. "The pendency of a prior suit is, as a rule, the basis of a plea in abatement

of a later one brought in the same court. But even that is not so when one of the
suits is brought in a federal court and the other in a state court of concurrent
jurisdiction, and the judgment sought is a personal one." Franceschi v. De Tord,
71 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1934) at 98, holding that plaintiff's assertion of his federal
cause of action as a counterclaim in a subsequent state suit is no ground for abatement of the federal action. Accord, Klina v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S.
226, 232 (1922) (dictum) ; McCellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
44. See note 40, supra.

45. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 232 (1922).
46. See CLARK, CODE PLUADING (2d ed. 1947), at 505, n. 14, citing the various
codes. No such provision is contained in the federal rules.
It is clear, however, that the state code demurrer is not available where the
federal action was commenced after the state action. Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F.
Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1945).
47. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 46, at 518.
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appear on the face of the complaint, the objection may be taken by
answer,"" Nevertheless, there is considerable doubt that in the circumstance posed the state court will look upon an answer in abatement with
favor. The general rule that the pendency of a prior suit in one jurisdiction cannot be pleaded in abatement to a subsequent suit in another jurisdiction even though both suits are between the same parties and upon the
same cause of action,"' has been read into the code provision."' Abatement
under such a provision is therefore granted only in the limited circumstance where the prior action is pending in another court in the same state.
Furthermore, the required identity of parties has been strictly construed
by state courts."
Courts could sacrifice the policy underlying strict construction of the
removal statute in modern diversity cases," and allow removal in order to
prevent multiple litigation where a counterclaim is asserted for the jurisdictional amount." But such a rule would be subject to limitations which
would seriously impair its function. For example, under the suggested
theory, a federal plaintiff who asserts his cause of action as a counterclaim
in a subsequent state court suit commenced by his opponent should be able
to remove the whole duplicating action from the state court and consolidate

48. Id. at 603.
49. See note 43, supra. See also Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App.2d
119, 123, 214 P.2d 844, 848 (1950).
50. See, e.g., Simmons v. Superior Court, supra note 49, at 123, 848; Oneida
Bank v. Bonney, 101 N.Y. 173 (1886).
51. See, e.g., Hamm v. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal Co., 44 Cal. App.2d
47, 111 P.2d 940 (1941) (abatement will not lie as to cross suits pending in same
jurisdiction); Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Tuolumne Gold Dredging Co., 63 Cal.
App.2d 21, 146 P.2d 61 (1944) (parties in both suits must stand in same relative
position as plaintiff or defendant).
52. See text at notes 31-36, supra.
53. If the prevention of multiple litigation becomes the underlying rationale
for removal in these cases, then it would be immaterial whether the counterclaim
were permissive or compulsory. The fact that a claim and a compulsory counterclaim appear to be more like a single matter in controversy than a claim and
a permissive counterclaim becomes unimportant. Compare 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTCic f[ 13.20 (2d ed. 1948). Removal would be permitted if the state court
counterclaim could be duplicated in the federal court, or if a suit on a claim in
excess of $3000 were pending in a federal court and the opposing party pleaded
counterclaims and subsequently sued on them in a state court. In the latter case,
the federal plaintiff would assert his claim as a counterclaim in the state court
and be permitted to remove. Furthermore, those cases in which jurisdictional
amount is established by aggregating a claim and a counterclaim would be overruled should this rationale be adopted. Where both claims involve $3000 or less,
there is no danger of duplication of either claim since the original jurisdiction of
a federal court in diversity cases does not extend to such claims. Compare the
reasoning of Professor Moore at 3 MO0Ro,op. cit. supra, 13.20, n. 3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss3/2
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it with the original federal action. Since the counterclaimant is designated
a "defendant" in the state action, Section 1441(a) authorizes him to remove,' if it is assumed that his counterclaim establishes jurisdictional
amount. But suppose a defendant -who possesses and asserts a counterclaim in excess of $3000 in a state action subsequently institutes original
action on his claim in a district court. The state court plaintiff should
be able to remove the state action to prevent duplication. Taking a functional view, the plaintiff is a defendant as to the counterclaim." But
by a parity of reasoning, the defendant who asserts a counterclaim in a
suit brought subsequent to his federal action must be a plaintiff respecting
his counterclaim and therefore incapable of removing pursuant to Section
1441(a). It could be argued, however, that the term "defendant" is sufficiently broad to cover both defendants to counterclaims and defendants to
an original complaint. But there is strong precedent opposed to such a
theory. In Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets," the Supreme Court held
that a foreign plaintiff could not base removal of a state court action on a
permissive counterclaim in excess of $3000 pleaded by the defendant.
Although the plaintiff originally claimed damages for more than $3000 in
the state court, and the Supreme Court could have invoked the doctrine of
waiver, 7 it flatly stated that the plaintiff could not remove regardless
of the amount of his original claim." The Court thought the question of
removal by plaintiffs foreclosed by the present statutory provision confining
removal to "defendants,"" 5 whereas, it noted, the prior statute specifically
provided for removal by either party. 0 But even if a broad definition of

54. See text at note 2, supra.
55. It has been so held: Merchants Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 151 U.S. 368 (1894); Hansen v. Pacific Coast Asphalt
Cement Co., 243 Fed. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1917); Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (S.D.
Iowa 1891); Haney v. Wilcheck, 38 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Va. 1941).
56. 313 U.S. 100 (1941), noted 29 CAi". L. RLv. 769 (1941), 27 VA. L. REV.
1094 (1941).
57. See text at note 6, supra.
58. Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, U.S. 100 (1941), at 108.
59. Id. at 106-7. And see text at note 2, supra.
60. Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941), at 106. The
House Report cited in the Court's footnote 2 at page 106 does not help to bear out
the broad ramifications attributed by the court to the change. "In the opinion of

the committee," the report declares, "it is believed to be just and proper to re-

quire the plaintiff to abide his selection of a forum. If he elects to sue in a state
court when he might have brought his suit in a federal court there would seem
to be, ordinarily, no good reason to allow him to remove the cause. Experience in

the practice under the act of 1875 has shown that such a privilege is often used
by plaintiffs to obtain unfair concessions and compromises from defendants who
are unable to meet the expenses incident to litigation in the federal courts remote
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"defendant" were adopted, the use of removal to prevent multiple litigation could never be fully effective. Because its historic function is to prevent local prejudice, the right of removal is limited to a foreign party.01
Thus, removal would often be unavailable solely because the potential remover originally sued in his own state or was forced to litigate there.
To preserve the limits of original federal jurisdiction as defined by
Barnes," and fully implement the policy of preventing multiple litigation, °"
district courts should instead exercise their equitable power to stay an action if such action is shown to duplicate a counterclaim which has been or
can be asserted in a prior state suit.- Since it is addressed to the discretion
of the court, the stay is not subject to the technical barriers noted above
which impede the use of a demurrer or an answer in abatement as a remedy
in these circumstances.05 And, unlike the use of an injunction, it does not
result in the forcible assertion of the will of one court against a court of
another jurisdiction.
Federal courts already grant a stay in an analogous situation. Thus in
actions involving the discretion of a federal court to grant relief by declaratory judgment, the court may properly refuse to proceed where,
because of the duplicating character of the federal action, it serves no useful
purpose.08 A case even closer in point, and a landmark in undermining the
doctrine of absolute access to the federal courts, is Mottolese v. Kaufman."
It was there held by the Second Circuit that a district court had discretion
to stay proceedings in a stockholder's derivative suit where an identical action had already been commenced in the courts of New York. The Second
Circuit rested its decision on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and on

from their homes." Id. at 106-7 n. 2. Therefore, the court might well have decided
the Shamrock case on the ground of waiver alone. And, furthermore, it would
seem consonant with the stated purpose of the amendment to allow a foreign
plaintiff with a claim of $3000 or less to remove if a counterclaim for the jurisdictional amount is asserted against him.
61. MooR, COMMENTARY 233.

62. See text at notes 16-21, supra.
63. See, e.g., the statement of the court in Simmons v. Superior Court, 96
Cal.App.2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950), at 124-25, 849.
64. A motion to obtain an order to stay an action should be distinguished
from a demurrer and an answer in abatement. The latter two are granted as a
matter of legal right, while the former is addressed to the discretion of the court.
Simmons v. Superior Court, supra note 63, at 123, 848; International Nickel Co.
v. Barry, 204 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953); Arkay Infants Wear v. Kline's, 98 F.

Supp. 862 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
65. See text at notes 42-43 and 44-51, supra.
66. Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
67. 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
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cases where district courts held that they possessed equitable powers to
stay suits which duplicated prior actions in other district courts." If the
result of Barnes is correct, as this writer contends, then giving the district
court the power to stay a suit that is really a counterclaim in a prior nonremovable state action is, as to Mottolese, an a fortiori case: a stay in
such circumstances would also effectuate the limitations thus placed on the
original jurisdiction of federal courts. 9 State courts should likewise refuse
to hear duplicating actions commenced by federal defendants on the
grounds of comity and preventing multiple litigation.7°
Although a stay should be a discretionary remedy and not obtainable
as of right, there should be a presumption in favor of granting it where
the defendant alleges and proves the existence of an identical cause of action already pending as a counterclaim against him in another forum, or
capable of being asserted as such. Evidence pertaining to the ordinary advantages of litigating in a federal court, such as the supposed superiority
of judges and juries, the desirability of obtaining discovery or other procedural machinery of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the power
of federal judges to comment on the evidence, should not be sufficient to
rebut the presumption that a stay should be granted.71 However, if it
can be shown that the prior action was instituted in bad faith for the
primary purpose of delaying its determination and forcing an unreasonable settlement, the presumption should be held to be rebutted. Such a case
would exist, for example, if the federal defendant commenced the prior
action with knowledge that the subsequent suit would probably be brought
and the docket in the first forum is so crowded as to make it likely that a
hold-up settlement would be procured if the subsequent action is not allowed to proceed.
68. As to the latter category of cases see Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire
Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936); International Nickel Co. v. Barry, 204 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953);
Arkay Infants Wear v. Kline's, 98 F. Supp 862 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
69. Compare the effect of a stay with the text at notes 37-41, supra.
70. Authority for such a proposition already exists in an analogous case,
Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 125, 214 P.2d 844, 849 (1950),

where, "as a matter of comity," a California court stayed a California suit for
divorce pending the final determination of a prior divorce action between the same
parties in Texas.
71. The Mottolese case took an intermediate position on this point. The
court left the door open to further proceedings in the district court if it could

be shown that defendants refused to submit to as full examination in the New
York court as the plaintiff could obtain under the federal rules. Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1949). This aspect of the case has been
soundly and extensively criticized in Note 59, YALE L. J. 978 (1950).
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Conclusion
Expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction beyond the boundaries
clearly set out by Congress is unjustified because hostility to nonresidents
in local courts, the original rationale of such jurisdiction, is largely nonexistent today. The use of counterclaims, whether permissive or compulsory, to establish the jurisdictional amount constitutes an attempt to transgress this new policy basis for strictly construing the removal statute.
But decisions denying removal in such cases must be implemented by
the use of the stay to prevent subsequent independent actions commenced
in federal courts based on these counterclaims. Furthermore, a stay prevents multiple litigation as well as effectuating the restriction placed on
diversity jurisdiction by the Barnes case. The present rule which permits
in personam suits between the same antagonists to proceed concurrently in
two forums is highly questionable when the first forum is capable of dealing with the controversy. And where a state court suit is based on a
claim for less than $3000 which has been or can be asserted as a counterclaim in a previously instituted federal action, the policy of preventing
multiple litigation is sufficient justification for the state court to deny
plaintiff a forum by the use of a stay.
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